

**TOP SECRET**  
SECURITY INFORMATION

15 September 1952

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**TOP SECRET SUPPLEMENT**

**TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST**



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Office of Current Intelligence

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

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State Dept. review completed

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SOUTHEAST ASIA

25X1C 1. Chinese Communist troops partially withdrawn from Indo-china: From an original 5,000 to 6,000, [REDACTED] there are now only 2,500 to 3,000 Chinese Communist troops in northwest Tonkin, the others having returned to China. Opposing the Chinese are 3,000 French-led Meo tribesmen who have restricted their activities, pending resupply by French airdrop with the imminent end of the rainy season. [REDACTED]

25X1C

25X1 [REDACTED]

25X1 Comment: [REDACTED] predicted earlier that only one understrength Chinese battalion would remain in Indochina when the bulk of the troops withdrew.

25X1


NEAR EAST - AFRICA

2. Mossadeq and his opposition in deadlock: Prime Minister Mossadeq is unable to accept any western proposals because of his fear of left and right wing extremists. However, the Prime Minister's opposition in the Majlis dares not go farther than to disclaim responsibility for any of his actions. Accordingly, new offers to settle the oil dispute are useless and the West should concentrate on convincing Iranian opinion that the onus for the break with the West lies with Mossadeq.

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25X1

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3. Iranian conservatives again plot to remove Mossadeq: Two [redacted] have separately reported to Ambassador Henderson that a conservative group is considering a plan to oust Mossadeq. The group apparently intends to enlist the aid of Mullah Kashani and then "discard" him after it is firmly in control. Although it is working without the Shah's knowledge, it intends to "save him in spite of himself."

25X1

The plotters favor constitutional action against Mossadeq, but one stated that "special measures" might be necessary. [redacted] said that the attempt might take place in about three weeks. [redacted]

25X1

Comment: There is no indication that the opposition is strong enough to carry out a coup or defeat Mossadeq in parliament. Kashani's support by some of the more violent nationalists, his willingness to accept Communist aid, and his lack of scruples suggest that he or the Tudeh might be the eventual victor if such an attempt succeeded.

4. Greek Government requests inclusion in MEDO discussion: Deputy Prime Minister Venizelos presented an aide-memoire to Ambassador Peurifoy on 12 September requesting inclusion of the Greek Government in the talks to be held on the Middle East Defense Organization. Similar notes were delivered to the embassies of the other sponsoring powers.

25X1

The note emphasizes Greek interest in Middle Eastern defense problems and suggests that the traditional Greek-Arab friendship makes Greek participation desirable. [redacted]

25X1

Comment: An 11 August approach in Washington foreshadowed this formal request. The Greeks have been spurred into action in part by their recognition of the important position the Turks will assume in the new organization. The present discussions on MEDO, like the original plans for the Middle East Command, do not envisage Greek participation.

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5. French Resident General is pessimistic over Morocco's political future: The French Resident General pessimistically reviewed Moroccan political developments for American officials on 8 September. He stated that a reply will soon be delivered to the Sultan's March demands for a greater degree of autonomy, but that it would not satisfy the latter, who is making a strong bid for popular support. If the Resident should now give in to the Sultan, Morocco would return to pre-1912 anarchy.

The Resident said that his predecessor was prevented from deposing the Sultan by American intervention, and that he himself had unsuccessfully courted the monarch's favor. He suggested that the American Government could support France by developing confidence in French administration, refraining from encouragement of Moroccan nationalists, changing the American popular conception of French colonial repression in North Africa, and trying to persuade the Latin American countries to support France's position in the United Nations.

25X1

Comment: Implicit in the Resident's remarks is the oft-repeated French request for an official American statement supporting French policy in North Africa.

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